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Federal Reserve Communications and Emerging Equity Markets 
 
Abstract 
Work on the impact of U.S. monetary policy on emerging financial markets mostly focuses on 
official federal funds rate announcements; empirical evidence using data on informal 
communication channels, such as speeches, is scant. Employing a unique data set covering 
formal and informal communication channels in a GARCH model framework, we provide 
comprehensive evidence on the effects of U.S. monetary policy on 17 emerging equity market 
returns over the period 1998–2009. We find, first, that both monetary policy actions and 
communications have a significant impact on market returns. Second, target rate change 
surprises are an important driver of emerging market returns. However, informal 
communications—particularly when taking into account their higher frequency—have a 
larger (cumulative) influence on returns than do target rate surprises. Third, during the 
financial crisis, central bank communication plays an even more pronounced role. Finally, 
American emerging markets react more to U.S. central bank communications than do non-
American markets. We discuss the policy implications of the findings. 
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1.  Introduction 
According to the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, published by the International 
Monetary Fund, the United States is the world’s largest investor. U.S. investors held about 
30% of the world’s reported portfolio investment assets throughout 2001–2009. The U.S. 
dollar dominates the payment flows of private international transactions; it was involved in 
89% of all currency transactions in 2009. Given this importance of the United States to 
international capital flows, it is likely that news about U.S. monetary policy influences stock 
markets around the world. During the recent financial crisis, we expect central bank actions 
and communications to play an even more pronounced role. Like many other central banks, 
the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) implemented various measures, in addition to lowering short-
term interest rates, to mitigate the effects of the crisis. As some of these additional measures 
are “unorthodox,” the Fed also put a lot of emphasis on communication in an effort to explain 
and prepare the public for them. 
Given the importance of the Fed during normal times, as well as in times of crisis, it is 
unsurprising that the impact of U.S. monetary policy on foreign equity indexes is investigated 
frequently. However, the focus of this work is chiefly on formal policy announcements. The 
starting point of our analysis is the expectation that financial markets not only adjust to formal 
monetary policy announcements, but also to informal channels of communication by the Fed, 
such as speeches and testimony by Board of Governors members. Consequently, one would 
expect agents in foreign equity markets to take into account informal U.S. monetary policy 
news in addition to formal news. For instance, Hayo et al. (2010) show that mature European 
and Pacific equity market returns react significantly to different types of informal 
communication by Fed officials. An important unexplored research question is whether 
emerging financial markets have a similar reaction to informal U.S. monetary policy 
communication. 
In this paper, we address four research questions. First, does U.S. monetary policy 
action and communication have an economically significant impact on equity returns in 
emerging markets? Second, if so, do markets react differently to official rate changes versus 
less formalized channels of monetary policy like speeches and testimony? Third, is there a 
different reaction to U.S. monetary policy measures during the financial crisis, which began in 
August 2007? Finally, are there region-specific differences in emerging market reactions? 
Answers to these questions have significant policy implications. For example, if informal 
communications move the markets as much as official announcements, officials need to be 
cautious about what they say—especially during a crisis period—and investors need to 4 
account for the effects of informal channels in their hedging and portfolio selection. If the 
findings indicate a significant transmission of communication of U.S. monetary policy to 
emerging economies via financial markets and this is not desirable, policymakers in these 
economies need to design effective policies to shield their markets from such influences. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief 
overview of the extant literature and how it relates to our contribution. Section 3 describes the 
construction of monetary policy news and presents the econometric methodology. In Section 
4, we illustrate our results. Section 5 concludes with the policy implications of our findings. 
 
2.  Related Literature and Our Contribution 
A growing literature investigates the effects of U.S. news—particularly U.S. monetary policy 
actions—on emerging markets. Hausman and Wongswan (2006) document the impact of U.S. 
monetary policy announcement surprises on financial markets in 49 countries. Global equity 
indexes respond chiefly to the target surprise; exchange rates and long-term interest rates 
respond mainly to the path surprise (a revision to the path of future monetary policy); and 
short-term interest rates respond to both surprises. Equity indexes and interest rates in 
countries with a less flexible exchange rate regime respond more to U.S. monetary policy 
surprises. In addition, the percentage of each country’s equity market capitalization owned by 
U.S. investors and the share of each country’s trade that is with the United States are also 
important factors in explaining the variation. 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) analyze 50 equity markets worldwide and show that 
returns fall on average around 2.7% in response to a 100 basis point tightening of U.S. 
monetary policy. A stronger effect of the policy is found for countries that have open and 
relatively more liquid financial markets. They also find that the degree of global real and 
financial integration, not a country’s bilateral integration with the United States, is a key 
determinant of the policy transmission process. Wongswan (2009) documents the impact of 
U.S. monetary policy surprises on equity indexes in 15 developed and emerging countries. He 
illustrates that an unanticipated 25 basis point cut in the federal funds target rate is associated 
with a 0.5–2.5% increase in foreign equity indexes. The variation in response across countries 
is more related to the degree of financial integration these countries have with the United 
States, rather than with trade linkages or the degree of exchange rate flexibility. Robitaille and 
Roush (2006) find that an increase in U.S. interest rates due to Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) decisions results in a systematic increase in bond spreads and a decline 5 
in stock prices in Brazil. Their results suggest that financial linkages play a greater role than 
real economic linkages in determining the response of Brazilian asset values to U.S. news. 
Several papers focus on how emerging bond markets react to U.S. target rate changes 
and other nonmonetary policy news. Andritzky et al. (2007) show that global bond spreads 
respond to rating actions and changes in U.S. interest rates rather than to domestic data and 
policy announcements. Examining country subsamples, they discover that U.S. news matters 
less to countries with more transparent policies and higher credit ratings. Arora and Cerisola 
(2001) show that stance and predictability of U.S. monetary policy are important for 
stabilizing capital flows and capital market conditions in emerging markets. Alper (2006) 
concludes that the unanticipated component of U.S. monetary policy is significant in 
explaining movements in emerging markets’ sovereign bond spreads. Özatay et al. (2009) 
demonstrate that EMBI spreads in 18 emerging markets respond substantially to U.S. 
macroeconomic news and changes in the Federal Reserve’s target rate. The magnitude and 
sign of the effect of U.S. news, however, crucially depend on the state of the U.S. economy. 
Uribe and Yue (2006) illustrate that in response to an increase in U.S. interest rates, emerging 
country spreads first fall and then display a delayed but large overshooting pattern. 
Miniane and Rogers (2007) find that capital controls do not effectively insulate 
countries from U.S. monetary policy shocks. Countries with more stringent capital controls do 
not experience smaller interest rate increases in response to contractionary U.S. monetary 
shocks than do countries without capital controls. Other factors, such as exchange rate regime 
or degree of dollarization, explain more of the cross-country differences. Dailami et al. (2008) 
discover that U.S. interest rates affect secondary market spreads differently, depending on 
countries’ debt levels. Moderate sovereign debtors suffer little impact from an increase in 
U.S. interest rates, whereas countries close to insolvency face a much steeper increase in their 
spread. Fender et al. (2010) show that U.S. monetary policy actions and communications have 
at least as much of an economic influence on emerging market credit default spreads as do 
changes in country ratings. 
Empirical evidence using data on informal communication channels in the context of 
emerging markets is scant. The literature (for a comprehensive survey, see Blinder et al., 
2008) focuses mostly on mature markets and shows how important a tool communication is 
for central bankers. Communication helps market participants make necessary adjustments 
gradually in the run-up to the expected interest rate decision. There are several interesting 6 
patterns that emerge from the related literature.
1 First, central bank communications regarding 
the economic outlook (EO) and the course of monetary policy (MP) have a significant impact 
on domestic financial market returns and volatility. Second, the impact on financial markets is 
larger when the communication channel is more formal: post-meeting statements 
accompanying interest decisions or monetary policy reports are more important than speeches 
and congressional hearings. Third, if the speaker has a more prominent position on the 
respective committee, financial markets react more significantly. 
In this paper, we extend existing work by examining the effects of U.S. monetary 
policy actions and communications (post-meeting statements, monetary policy reports, 
testimony, and speeches) on emerging equity market returns. We employ a GARCH model 
with country-specific fixed effects to capture the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
that characterizes many financial series. The GARCH approach allows estimating these series 
more efficiently, taking into account time-varying conditional volatility of asset prices. Our 
contribution to the literature lies in the use of a new data set that captures less formalized 
channels of U.S. monetary policy, in addition to formal channels, and an empirical 
investigation into their relative impact on emerging equity markets. Finally, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study on informal communication that also covers the recent 
financial crisis and we explicitly address the question of whether there is a different financial 
market reaction in “crisis times” compared to “normal times.” 
Our analysis focuses on emerging stock markets because they tend to be exposed to 
foreign news and, in particular, U.S. news for several reasons. Emerging economies rely on 
foreign investments to finance their catching-up process. They are also highly integrated with 
the U.S. economy via international trade. For example, an upswing in the U.S. economy is 
bound to improve the domestic economic outlook and hence increase trade flows between 
emerging economies and the United States. Emerging market economies are typically small 
and open, and tend to import inflation via exchange rate pass-through. Finally, emerging 
markets are characterized by the increasing global financial market integration itself. Thus, 
we would expect that emerging financial markets react to U.S. monetary policy news. 
 
                                                 
1 For instance, see, among many others, Guthrie and Wright (2000) for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand; 
Andersson et al. (2006) for the Sveriges Riksbank; Connolly and Kohler (2004) for six central banks; Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher (2007) for three central banks; Hayo et al. (2008) for the Fed; Hayo and Neuenkirch (2010) for 
the Bank of Canada; Ranaldo and Rossi (2010) for the Swiss National Bank. 7 
3.  Data and Econometric Methodology 
In our analysis, we use a new data set introduced by and described in detail in Hayo et al. 
(2008) and extend it until December 2009 to include more observations for the recent crisis 
period. The data set covers 837 speeches and 201 congressional hearings by Board of 
Governors members, as well as 94 post-meeting statements and 26 monetary policy reports 
(MPR).
2 Following the literature (e.g., Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007), we sort the 
communication content into two categories: monetary policy or economic outlook. Coding for 
U.S. economic outlook is either “positive” (EO+) or “negative” (EO–). “Tightening” (MP+) 
or “easing” (MP–) are the categories for the Fed’s monetary policy stance. We employ 
dummy variables that are split into positive and negative news to take into account possible 
asymmetrical reactions of financial markets.
3 In total, there are 16 communication dummies 
as the four types (statements, MPR, testimony, speeches) can be coded into the four different 
categories EO+, EO–, MP+, and MP–. 
In designing these news categories, we carefully read the speeches twice and then 
coded them independently into the appropriate dummy categories. In the case of an inter-
coder conflict, we read the speech yet again and adjusted our indicators accordingly. We 
employed extensive robustness checks to ensure that our results do not depend on the 
particular coding of ambiguous individual observations. We provide a few examples of 
speeches, along with our classification scheme, in the Appendix. 
We also incorporate several variables controlling for the additional measures 
undertaken by the Fed during the financial crisis. These are grouped into five categories: (i) 
the discount rate change on August 17, 2007, (ii) the announcement of joint initiatives with 
the federal government, (iii) the announcement of additional unilateral liquidity actions, (iv) 
the announcement of internationally coordinated liquidity actions, and (v) the announcement 
of measures to mitigate the problems in the asset-backed security market. 
Our emerging market indicator comprises daily closing returns on stock markets
4 in 17 
countries over the period January 2, 1998 to December 31, 2009.
5 The sample consists of 
                                                 
2 Hayo et al. (2008) also provide data for speeches by regional Fed presidents. Their results show that presidents’ 
speeches do not have any systematic influence on U.S. financial market returns. Therefore, we omit these 
communications from our analysis. 
3 For example, evidence of this type of asymmetry can be found in the impact of IMF statements on financial 
returns in emerging markets (Hayo and Kutan, 2005) or in the effects of FOMC communication on U.S. 
financial market returns (Hayo et al., 2008). 
4 We attempted to extend our analysis to bond and foreign exchange markets. To avoid problems with de jure or 
de facto pegged exchange rate regimes, we selected only those countries classified by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) as having flexible exchange rate regimes. However, country-specific estimations, as well as pooled 
regressions, led to puzzling results, in which no systematic pattern could be discerned. Possibly, these markets 
are either not liquid enough or they react more strongly to domestic news. Given these preliminary findings, we 
decided to concentrate the analysis on stock markets. 8 
50,881 observations (17 countries and 2,993 days). The country selection is based on the June 
2006 Emerging Market Index by Morgan Stanley and includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, the 
Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and Thailand.
6 Composite stock returns for the stacked 
sample with country-specific fixed effects are computed by taking the first differences of 
logged daily stock price indices. The use of a panel framework is helpful for obtaining a 
larger number of observations for each type of news and it improves estimation efficiency. 
Potential problems associated with panel data estimation involve assuming equal coefficients 
across countries and a common error structure. 
Descriptive statistics show that the emerging market series exhibit excess kurtosis but 
almost no skewness (see Table A1 in the Appendix), indicating volatility clustering (Engle, 
1982). Since preliminary OLS estimations show significant ARCH effects (F(1,50879) = 
870.2**), we employ a GARCH model. We start with a general GARCH(1,1) specification 
(Bollerslev, 1986) as follows: 
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where and are parameters or vectors of parameters,  
is an indicator function as defined in the last line above, t|t-1 = t(v), with t-1 capturing all 
the information up to t–1, and t(v) is a t-distribution with v degrees of freedom. 
                                                                                                                                                          
5 We choose daily data instead of intra-day data for two reasons. At a conceptual level, we are interested in the 
question of whether there are effects of economic importance characterized by a minimum degree of persistence 
over time instead of just picking out short blips in the data. At a practical level, we find it impossible to time the 
central bank communications precisely in, say, 10-minute intervals, as is possible in the case of newswire 
reports. 
6 We omitted six countries from the Morgan Stanley Index as they can no longer be categorized as “true” 
emerging markets: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are members of the European Union and the 
OECD. Büttner et al. (2009) find that European news rather than U.S. news has an impact on these markets. 
Korea and Turkey are members of the OECD; Taiwan is omitted due to its large market capitalization. To 
confirm that our selection of countries is appropriate, we calculate country-specific models and find that these 
countries are not affected as systematically as our selection of “emerging” markets and have different reactions 
to news. Colombia and Morocco are left out as data for these countries are not available for the full period 1998–
2009. 9 
The general specification (Equation (1)) is an autoregressive-distributed lag model 
with six lags. The vector of control variables contains past emerging market returns, S&P 
1200 returns to proxy world stock market conditions, growth rates of the corresponding 
EMBIG regional spreads
7 to approximate an emerging market bond environment, and growth 
rates of the broad U.S. dollar index to control for movements in the external value of the U.S. 
dollar.
8 The contemporaneous other market returns and U.S. returns are omitted to avoid 
simultaneity problems. Country-specific effects
9 and day of the week effects
10 are captured by 
dummies. Equation (1) has several special features. First, student-t distributed errors 
(Bollerslev, 1987) are assumed; these provide a better approximation to residuals that are not 
normally distributed. Second, the variance enters the mean equation (Engle et al., 1987) to test 
whether volatility as a measure of risk is priced in the markets. Asymmetric effects of shocks 
(Engle and Ng, 1993), defined as the last period’s forecast errors, are included in the model if 
 is significantly different from zero. In addition, asymmetry thresholds (Glosten et al., 1993) 
are captured when  is not equal to zero. 
Target rate changes (split into expected hikes, expected cuts, surprise hikes, and 
surprise cuts),
11 Federal Reserve communications, and the additional measures taken during 
the financial crisis are included on the day the news actually reaches the respective market, 
which means we need to account for time-zone differences, as, e.g., a noon speech in the 
United States is heard in the Philippines after that country’s stock exchange has closed. The 
timing issue is illustrated in Figure 1. According to this stylized schedule, the variables enter 
the equation on the day the news actually hits the respective market. To disentangle the 
influence of Fed actions and communications during the financial crisis from the ones during 




                                                 
7 An augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) test shows that all regional EMBIG series are non-stationary in log levels 
but stationary in growth rates. 
8 Data sources: Thomson Datastream for stock market data, JPMorgan for EMBIG Spread, and Federal Reserve 
statistical release H.10 for Broad U.S. FX index. 
9 Argentina is used as base category for the country dummies. 
10 Monday is used as reference day. 
11 Bloomberg surveys are used to identify surprises from scheduled meetings. Inter-meeting moves are naturally 
classified as surprises. Target rate changes are coded as follows: 25 bps change: 1; 50 bps change: 2; 75 bps 
change: 3; otherwise: 0. 
12 We decided against separate estimations for pre-crisis and crisis periods and in favor of a nested model, for 
three reasons. First, we can now directly test for differences across coefficients. Second, the number of 
observations for each subsample varies considerably (2,392 during normal times; 601 during the crisis). Third, 
the communication variables also vary noticeably. In pre-crisis times, we have a tightening and easing cycle and 
the accompanying communications. In contrast, during the crisis we have only one easing cycle and indications 
of easing. 10 
Figure 1: Example of news timing in a different time zone 
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Next, we explore the heterogeneity in our sample in more detail by conducting 
separate regressions for each country,
13 and discover that there are notable differences in the 
reaction of the American countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru—compared 
to countries in the rest of the world. The former react to various forms of communication, 
while the latter are affected by only a few variables. Figure 1 reveals an obvious difference in 
the transmission mechanism: in American countries, speeches and target rate changes mostly 
occur during trading hours; in other countries, these events take place after market closure (or 
before market opening on the subsequent day).
 Although we address this timing problem by 
coding the news on the day it actually hits the respective markets, the difference between 
American markets and the rest of the world remains. To deal with this heterogeneity in the 
panel, we create separate target rate and communication variables for the American and the 
non-American countries. Accordingly, asymmetric adjustments across American and non-
American equity markets are also captured by separate coefficients for each region on the 
lagged dependent variable and financial market control variables. 
The general GARCH(1,1) model consists of 157 variables and seven GARCH terms. 
Starting from this comprehensive model, we exclude all the insignificant variables in a 
general-to-specific testing-down approach (see Hendry, 2000). The final model contains 47 
variables and seven GARCH terms (restriction test: Chi
2(110) = 125.4) and removes the 
volatility clustering in the residuals. The estimates show that we can rule out an integrated 
GARCH process (Nelson, 1990; Chi
2(1) = 28.3**). 
 
4.  Impact on Emerging Equity Market Returns 
In this section, we describe the impact of U.S. central bank communication and target rate 
changes on emerging equity market returns.  
 
                                                 
13 To conserve space, these regressions are not reported in detail. All omitted results are available upon request. 11 
Table 1: Explaining Emerging Market Equity Returns 
   America Non-America 
0  –0.014** 
1  –0.016** 
1  –0.972** 
Student-t  –3.082** 
Asymmetry  –0.399** 
Threshold  –0.017** 
Cond. Variance in Mean  –0.057** 
Constant Term  –0.169** 
9/11 –5.305** –3.822** 
India/Pakistan/Russia  –0.095** 
South Africa  –0.051** 
Wednesday  –0.118** 
Thursday  –0.077** – 0.044** 
Friday  –0.132** – 0.061** 
Returns t-1  –0.037** – 0.027** 
Returns t-2 –0.022** 
Returns t-5     –0.014** 
S&P 1200 t-1  –0.043** – 0.197** 
S&P 1200 t-2 –0.016** 
S&P 1200 t-3  –0.035** 
S&P 1200 t-6  –0.028**       
EMBIG t-1  –0.039** –0.063** 
EMBIG t-2  –0.036** 
EMBIG t-3  –0.056** 
EMBIG t-6 –0.036** 
Broad U.S. FX t-2        –0.083** 
   America  Non-America 
   Overall  Fin. Crisis  Overall  Fin. Crisis 
Target Rate Cut     –2.050**       
Target Rate Cut Surprise  –0.761**  –2.405**  –0.404**    
Statement MP –     –1.510**       
Statement EO +  –0.533** 
Statement EO –  –0.225** –3.670** 
MPR EO –  –0.244** 
Testimony MP +  –0.936** 
Testimony MP –  –0.889** 
Testimony EO +  –0.877** 
Speech MP +  –0.301** 
Speech MP –  –0.375** –0.366** 
Speech EO +  –0.211** – 0.468** 
Speech EO –           –0.236** 
Discount Rate Action  –––  –3.466**  –––    
Joint Action w/ Government  –––  –1.943**  ––– 
ABS Measure  –––  –0.441**  –––  –0.628** 
Notes: * (**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent. 
Number of observations: 50,881; 17 countries and 2,993 days. EO = Economic Outlook; MP = Monetary Policy. 12 
Table 1 shows that student-t errors with 3.1 degrees of freedom provide a better 
approximation to the residuals than a normal distribution. We find that last period’s negative 
forecast errors have a larger impact on current volatility of the emerging equity markets than 
do positive errors, implying that unspecified negative news has more influence on volatility 
than does positive news. Furthermore, the conditional variance has a significantly negative 
impact on the mean equation. This suggests that investors move out of emerging stock 
markets during times of higher conditional volatility, as the required risk premium is not 
priced in emerging market returns. The performances of the Indian, Pakistani, Russian, and 
South African stock markets are better than average. Statistical testing shows (Chi
2(2) = 
0.909) that the first three of these markets can be combined into one dummy variable to 
enhance estimation efficiency. Day of the week effects are found for both regions; however 
they are stronger in the countries from the American region than in the non-American 
countries.
14 
Weak market efficiency is violated as the first, second, and fifth lag can be used to 
predict today’s outcome.
15 Emerging equity markets are affected by global stock market 
conditions via lagged S&P 1200 returns. An ascending EMBIG spread (i.e., the spread 
between emerging market bonds and a U.S. benchmark bond) increases stock market returns, 
which implies that investors move their capital into emerging equity markets in times of 
higher bond returns. Finally, an appreciation of the broad U.S. dollar index leads investors to 
move out of non-American emerging equity markets.
16 
Turning to monetary policy variables (bottom half of Table 1), we first describe the 
impact on emerging equity markets over the whole sample (the “Overall” columns). Target 
rate changes matter for both regions only in the case of a surprise cut: a 25 bps surprise cut 
increases American (non-American) market returns by 76 (40) bps.
17 American markets are 
influenced by a greater variety of central bank communication and the reaction is also 
numerically larger. Statements referring to a negative economic outlook lower returns in 
                                                 
14 A “Wednesday effect” is found only for the American countries and the “Friday effect” is statistically larger in 
American than in non-American countries (Chi
2(1) = 8.9**). The “Thursday effect” is statistically equal in both 
regions (Chi
2(1) = 1.8). 
15 For both regions markets, the sum of lagged returns is statistically insignificant (Chi
2(1) = 1.1 for American 
countries; Chi
2(1) = 2.3 for non-American countries). 
16 In the case of changes in global equity conditions, non-American markets are more affected than American 
markets (test of significant differences between coefficients: Chi
2(1) = 97.3**). The impact of the bond market 
environment is statistically equal across both regions (Chi
2(1) = 0.056). 
Within American countries, the influence of equity and bond conditions is statistically equal (Chi
2(1) = 3.8).  
In contrast, within non-American countries, the S&P 1200 is more important than the EMBIG spread (Chi
2(1) = 
15.6**) and the broad U.S. FX index (Chi
2(1) = 21.3**). The influence of bond and FX conditions is statistically 
equal (Chi
2(1) = 0.0002).  
17 Statistical testing reveals no evidence in favor of asymmetric adjustments between both regions (Chi
2(1) = 
2.1). 13 
American markets by 23 bps. Non-American markets are affected negatively when this type 
of news is disseminated in a monetary policy report (24 bps). Testimony hinting at a 
tightening of monetary policy depresses American markets by 94 bps—the biggest economic 
reaction across all target rate changes and communication variables for the entire period and 
statistically larger than the reaction to speeches with the same content (30 bps).
18 Finally, a 
bright economic outlook results in a positive stock market reaction in American countries (21 
bps). Considering the size of the reaction, one should take into account the median value of 
the absolute daily changes in emerging equity returns (74 bps) observed over the sample 
period, which implies that the impact of monetary policy actions and communications is of 
economic relevance. 
The additional influence during the financial crisis is captured by interaction variables 
(the “Fin. Crisis” columns in the lower half of Table 1). Expected target rate cuts increase 
American equity returns by 205 bps. However, this coefficient is offset by the influence of 
surprise target rate cuts (–241 bps).
19 If the central bank cuts the rate by more than expected 
(or at an unscheduled meeting), the action is interpreted by financial market agents as a signal 
that the central bank has new information, indicating that the economy will perform (much) 
worse than expected. This also explains why markets react drastically to a negative economic 
outlook disseminated in a post-meeting statement during the financial crisis (–360 bps). In 
general, central bank communication plays a more pronounced role in terms of significance 
and size of the coefficients during the financial crisis. Post-meeting statements are carefully 
monitored by American financial markets: a statement indicating future target rate cuts brings 
some relief to financial markets and drives returns up by 151 bps. The same holds for a bright 
economic outlook (53 bps). Finally, a speech conveying a future rate cut does raise returns by 
38 bps, but is significantly less important than a post-meeting statement with the same 
content.
20 Non-American markets are mostly influenced by speeches and testimony during the 
financial crisis. The indication of a future rate cut causes higher yields (89 bps for testimony, 
37 bps for speeches), as does a brighter economic outlook (88 bps for testimony, 47 bps for 
speeches).
21 In contrast, a negative economic outlook speech depresses returns in non-
American countries (24 bps). 
The additional measures implemented by the Fed during the financial crisis affect 
American countries more than non-American countries. The discount rate cut on August 7, 
                                                 
18 Chi
2(1) = 4.4*. 
19 The sum of both coefficients is statistically equal to zero (Chi
2(1) = 0.502). 
20 Chi
2(1) = 13.6**. 
21 There is no significant difference between testimony and speeches in either case (Chi
2(1) = 1.8; Chi
2(1) = 1.7). 14 
2007 raises returns in the former countries by 347 bps. Measures to mitigate problems in the 
asset-backed security market lead to higher returns in both regions (44 bps in American 
countries, 63 bps in non-American countries).
22 Finally, coordinated actions by the Fed and 
federal government exert an influence similar to that of an unexpected target rate cut. Agents 
appear to believe that the coordinated effort is a signal that the situation is even worse than 
expected, causing returns to fall by 194 bps. 
Next, we consider the economic impact of central bank communication in comparison 
with actual target rate changes by taking into account that the former occurs much more often 
than the latter.  
 
Table 2: Cumulative Returns for American and Non-American Markets 
   America Non-America 
   Overall  Fin. Crisis  Overall  Fin. Crisis 
Target Rate Cut     –42.02       
Target Rate Cut Surprise  –11.80 –15.63 0–6.26 
Statement MP –     019.63       
Statement EO +  004.80 
Statement EO –  0–6.06 –36.70 
MPR EO –  0–1.95 
Testimony MP +  0–3.74 
Testimony MP –  0–2.67 
Testimony EO +  0–2.63 
Speech MP +  –10.55 
Speech MP –  0–2.25  0–2.20 
Speech EO +  –20.86  0–3.74 
Speech EO –           0–3.77 
Discount Rate Action  –––  0–3.47 –––     
Joint Action w/ Government  –––  –11.66  ––– 
ABS Measure  –––  0–3.09 ––– 0–4.39 
Note: The variables are multiplied by their respective frequency per country to show their cumulative impact. 
 
Table 2 shows the cumulative effects of communication events in our sample period, 
differentiated across markets and concentrating on the significant coefficients from Table 1. A 
relatively small number of interest rate cuts generate noteworthy effects on returns. In the 
American (non-American) countries, target rate cut surprises cause equity returns to rise by 
11.8 (6.3) percentage points (pp) over the whole sample. However, the aggregated cumulative 
effects of informal communication are substantially larger than the impact of actual interest 
rate changes. This indicates that the coefficients estimated for single informal communication 
                                                 
22 The influence is statistically equal across both regions (Chi
2(1) = 0.401). 15 
events may disguise their actual importance for financial market movements. In particular, 
speeches conveying a bright economic outlook cause the largest cumulative reaction of all 
variables. American market returns are raised by 20.9 pp—an impact nearly twice as large as 
that caused by target rate cut surprises. Furthermore, Table 2 confirms that over the full 
sample, American markets are more affected than non-American markets: U.S. 
communication causes an absolute adjustment of American markets by 41.2 pp, whereas the 
impact on non-American markets is 2 pp. 
The influence of U.S. monetary policy action and communication during the financial 
crisis is noteworthy. Target rate cuts move American countries an additional 26.4 pp during 
that period—even after correcting for the offsetting effects of target rate cut surprises. 
Statements and additional measures by the Fed are the most important categories for 
American markets, confirming the impression from Table 1. For instance, the cumulative 
impact of post-meeting statements conveying a negative economic outlook is –36.7 pp and 
joint actions of the Fed and federal government move markets by a total of –11.7 pp. For non-
American markets, the cumulative absolute impact of testimony and speeches is “only” about 
15 pp. Thus, as is the case in “normal” times, during the financial crisis, American countries 
are relatively more influenced by U.S. monetary policy actions and communications than are 
non-American countries. 
For both the full sample period and during the financial crisis, American markets react 
more to U.S. monetary policy actions and communications than do non-American countries. 
In explaining regional differences in a related context, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) and 
Wongswan (2009) emphasize the importance of global integration and financial integration 
with the United States, respectively. Our work lends support to these explanations, as the 
trade share of American countries with the United States is between 37–57% (see Table A2 in 
the Appendix), whereas non-American countries have trade shares of only between 11–17%. 
Moreover, the financial integration of American countries, measured by the share of portfolio 
investment from the United States, is between 47–54% (see Table A3 in the Appendix); the 
share of portfolio investment in non-American countries ranges from 33 to 45%. 
In our view, the differences between American and non-American markets may have 
yet another cause. In a different context, Boubaker and Sebai (2009) find stronger intra-
continent causalities in stock markets than between stock markets in different continents. 
They explain this finding by the fact that in the former case, any significant correlation is 
realized on the same calendar day, while there is a time lag between continents. Cai et al. 
(2008) study informational linkages in the euro–dollar and dollar–yen exchange rates across 16 
five trading regions. They find that informational linkages within regions are more important 
than those across regions. Figure 1 shows that news hits the American markets (mostly) 
nearly simultaneously with its occurrence, whereas there is a time lag (mostly overnight) 
before the non-American markets receive the same news. Our results suggest that the impact 
of news dissipates overnight as non-American markets do not react to the same extent as 
American markets. Thus, we argue that the larger reaction of American markets can be 
explained by overlapping trading hours between them and the United States, resulting in U.S. 
news arriving in these markets while they are still open, in addition to their greater degree of 
economic and financial integration with the United States. 
 
5.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this paper, we study the effects of U.S. monetary policy action and communication on 
emerging equity market returns. Using a GARCH model, we analyze the influence of target 
rate changes, post-meeting statements, monetary policy reports, testimony, and speeches over 
the period 1998–2009, thus covering the recent financial crisis. We concentrate our analysis 
on four research questions. 
First, does U.S. monetary policy action and communication have an economically 
significant impact on equity returns in emerging markets? We show that target rate change 
surprises and central bank communication have a significant impact on emerging equity 
market returns. Ranging from 21 to 94 basis points over the whole sample, the magnitude of 
these effects is of economic relevance given the median value of the absolute daily changes in 
emerging equity returns (74 bps) in our sample. 
Second, if so, do markets react differently to official rate changes versus less 
formalized channels of monetary policy like speeches and testimony? Our point estimates 
suggest that the reactions are in a comparable range. However, informal communication—
particularly when taking into account its higher frequency—exerts a larger (cumulative) 
influence on returns. Specifically, speeches conveying a bright economic outlook result in the 
largest cumulative reaction of all variables. American market returns are raised by 20.9 pp—
nearly twice the size of the impact caused by target rate cut surprises. 
Third, is there a different reaction to U.S. monetary policy measures during the 
financial crisis, which began in August 2007? In general, central bank communication plays a 
more pronounced role in terms of significance and size of the coefficients during the financial 
crisis. For example, the additional cumulative influence of negative post-meeting statements 
in American markets is –36.7 pp. Target rate changes also exert a larger influence in the crisis 17 
period than during “normal times.” Several additional measures implemented by the Fed to 
mitigate the problems in the financial sector also cause a significant movement in emerging 
market returns. 
Finally, are there region-specific differences in emerging market reactions? We find 
significant variation in the reactions of American and non-American emerging markets—over 
the full sample and during the financial crisis—which we explain by differences in when the 
news reaches the markets. Occurrence and dissemination of news are nearly simultaneous for 
the American markets, whereas non-American markets experience a time lag (mostly 
overnight) before news can affect financial market prices. In addition, American emerging 
economies are more closely integrated with the United States in real and financial terms than 
are non-American emerging markets and, therefore, Fed monetary policy news has a larger 
impact on this group of countries. 
Our results have important implications for policymakers and investors. First, in 
addition to observing formal announcements, investors and policymakers need to pay 
attention to informal communication of U.S. monetary policy. Hayo et al. (2010) present 
similar findings for mature European and Pacific equity markets, although their results 
suggest that mature equity markets are even more influenced by communication and to a 
lesser extent by monetary policy actions. Arguably, these well-developed markets have a 
more sophisticated understanding of monetary policy than do emerging equity markets and 
thus are more alert to the possibly subtler nuances of informal communication. Based on these 
results, we conjecture that as these emerging markets continue to evolve, informal 
communication will become increasingly important to them. The increased influence of 
central bank communication during the financial crisis seems to support this conjecture. 
Second, the strong reactions during the financial crisis show how crucial central bank 
communication is in turbulent times. Financial markets closely monitor every speech and 
adjust their prices in reaction to a larger extent than they do during “normal times.” 
Third, the finding that American stock markets react more strongly to news of policy 
shocks from the United States than do non-American stock markets suggests that the former 
countries have a higher risk of contagion via both formal and informal channels and that 
investors focusing on the American region face a lower degree of portfolio diversification 
opportunities. 
Finally, in an extension of the analysis presented above, we find that U.S. monetary 
policy news has a larger impact on returns than on the volatility of returns. This suggests that 
the Fed’s actions generate primarily wealth effects rather than risk effects, as measured by the 18 
conditional variance of returns.
23 Thus, U.S. monetary policy announcements can 
significantly impact the wealth of investors in emerging economies, especially in the 
neighboring American economies. Prudent policymakers in these emerging markets should 
design policy strategies that effectively deal with the wealth and other effects of U.S. 
monetary policy actions and communications. 
                                                 
23 We insert our variables of interest in the volatility part of Equation (1). However, the size of the very few 
significant coefficients indicates an almost negligible economic impact. Results are available on request. 19 
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Appendix 
Examples of Speeches and Their Coding 
Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan before the Economic Club of New York (May 24, 
2001) 
Moreover, with inflation low and likely to be contained, the main threat to satisfactory 
economic performance appeared to come from excessive weakness in activity. So we took out 
the restraint inherent in our previous policy stance and have moved policy to a more 
accommodative posture to counter the effects of the downshift in demand. … The period of 
sub-par economic growth is not yet over, and we are not free of the risk that economic 
weakness will be greater than currently anticipated, requiring further policy response. 
 
Coding: 
Speech Economic Outlook Negative (EO–) 
Speech Monetary Policy Easing (MP–) 
 
 
Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan before the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Senate 
(April 21, 2004) 
The economy appears to have emerged around the middle of last year from an extended 
stretch of subpar growth and entered a period of more vigorous expansion. After having risen 
at an annual rate of 2 1/2 percent in the first half of last year, real GDP increased at an annual 
pace of more than 6 percent in the second half. … Although real GDP is not likely to continue 
advancing at the same pace as in the second half of 2003, recent data indicate that growth of 
activity has remained robust thus far this year. … As I have noted previously, the federal 




Testimony Economic Outlook Positive (EO+) 
Testimony Monetary Policy (MP+) 
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of Equity Market Returns 
   Mean Std.  Dev. Skewness Exc.  Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Overall 0.065  1.75  0.294 13.75  –21.86  33.40 
Argentina   0.073  2.29  0.065  4.89  –13.32  17.49 
Brazil   0.093  2.31  1.134  19.75  –15.83  33.40 
Chile   0.047  0.82  0.802  21.33  –4.89  12.42 
China   0.047  1.69  –0.002  5.14  –11.98  9.86 
Egypt   0.073  1.74  –0.088  6.31  –16.00  14.55 
India   0.071  1.79  –0.122  7.77  –14.13  17.74 
Indonesia   0.082  1.76  0.175  6.74  –12.13  14.03 
Israel   0.056  1.36  –0.177  4.41  –8.08  10.28 
Jordan   0.048  1.29  0.444  47.64  –18.57  21.99 
Malaysia   0.042  1.38  2.167  41.78  –13.28  23.14 
Mexico   0.078  1.65  0.383  5.07  –9.82  12.92 
Pakistan   0.077  1.77  –0.126  5.12  –12.38  13.61 
Peru   0.082  1.48  0.531  17.60  –10.81  19.88 
Philippines   0.035  1.58  0.827  13.43  –12.27  17.56 
Russia   0.090  2.80  –0.108  7.80  –21.86  22.39 
South Africa   0.067  1.39  –0.119  3.40  –7.59  7.39 
Thailand   0.041  1.74  0.282  7.57  –14.84  12.02 
 
 
Table A2: Trade with the United States 
   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
American  250 278 334 311 301 304 342 378 428 457 498 378 
%  American  52% 57% 57% 55% 55% 52% 48% 46% 43% 40% 37% 37%
Non-Am.  174 184 215 209 229 262 327 389 463 517 570 483 
%  Non-Am.  17% 17% 16% 16% 15% 14% 13% 13% 13% 12% 11% 11%
Trade with the United States in billions of USD and as a percentage of total trade. 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 
 
 
Table A3: Portfolio Investment from the United States 
   2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
American    94  83  120 146 195 242 321 171 
%  American  47% 51% 50% 51% 54% 52% 53% 50% 
Non-American  60  73  113 136 183 243 362 178 
%  Non-American  42% 45% 41% 38% 37% 36% 35% 33% 
Portfolio investment from the United States in billions of USD and as a percentage of total investment. 
Data are not available for China, Jordan, or Peru. 
Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF, 2002). 